Abstract. Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network.
Introduction
One of the important problems in cooperative game is how to distribute the total profit generated by a group of agents to individual participants. The prerequisite here is to make all the agents work together, i.e., form a grand coalition. To achieve this goal, the collective profit should be distributed properly so as to minimize the incentive of subgroups of agents to deviate and form coalitions of their own. This intuition is formally captured by several solution concepts, such as the core, the least-core, and the nucleolus, which will be the focus of this paper.
In this paper, we consider a kind of cooperative game models, path cooperative games (PC-games), arising from the situations where some commodity (traffic, liquid or information) flows through a network. In these games, each player controls an edge or a vertex of the network (called edge path cooperative games or vertex edge path cooperative games, respectively), a coalition of players wins if it enables a path from the source to the sink, and lose otherwise. We will focus on the algorithmic problems on game solutions of path cooperative games, especially core related solutions.
Path cooperative games have a natural correspondence with flow games. Flow games were first introduced by Kalai and Zemel [13] and studied extensively by many researchers. When there are public arcs in the network, the core of the
Preliminaries
A cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) consists of a player set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} and a characteristic function γ : 2 N → R with γ(∅) = 0. For each coalition S ⊆ N , γ(S) represents the profit obtained by S without help of other players. The set N is called the grand coalition. In what follows, we assume that γ(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N , and γ(∅) = 0.
An imputation of Γ is a payoff vector x = (x 1 , ...x n ) such that i∈N x i = γ(N ) and x i ≥ γ({i}), ∀i ∈ N . The set of imputations is denoted by I(Γ ). Throughout this paper, we use the shorthand notation x(S) = i∈S x i . Given a payoff vector x ∈ I(Γ ), the excess of coalition S ⊆ N with respect to x is defined as: e(x, S) = x(S)−γ(S). This value measures the degree of S's satisfaction with the payoff x.
Core. The core of a game Γ , denoted by C(Γ ), is the set of payoff vectors satisfying that, x ∈ C(Γ ) if and only if e(x, S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . These constraints, called group rationality, ensure that no coalition would have an incentive to split from the grand coalition N, and do better on its own.
Least-core. When C(Γ ) is empty, it is meaningful to relax the group rationality constraints by e(x, S) ≥ ε for all S ⊆ N . We shall find the maximum value ε * such that the set {x ∈ I(Γ ) : e(x, S) ≥ ε * , ∀S ⊆ N } is nonempty. This set of imputations is called the least-core, denoted by LC(Γ ), and ε * is called the value of LC(Γ ) or LC-value.
Nucleolus. Now we turn to the concept of the nucleolus. A payoff vector x generates a 2 n -dimensional excess vector θ(x) = (e(x, S 1 ), · · · , e(x, S 2 n )), whose components are arranged in a non-decreasing order. That is, e(x, S i ) ≤ e(x, S j ) for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 2 n . The nucleolus, denoted by η(Γ ), is defined to be a payoff vector that lexicographically maximizes the excess vector θ(x) over the set of imputations I(Γ ). It was proved by Schmeidler [19] that the nucleolus of a game with the nonempty imputation set contains exactly one element.
Monotone games and simple games. A game Γ = (N, γ) is monotone if γ(S ) ≤ γ(S) whenever S ⊆ S. A game is called a simple game if it is a monotonic game with γ : 2 N → {0, 1} such that γ(∅) = 0 and γ(N ) = 1. Simple games can be usually used to model situations where there is a task to be completed, a coalition is labeled as winning if and only if it can complete the task. Formally, coalition S ⊆ N is winning if γ(S) = 1, and losing if γ(S) = 0. A player i is called a veto player if he or she belongs to all winning coalitions. It is easy to see that, in a simple game, i is a veto player if and only if γ(N ) = 1 but γ(N \ {i}) = 0.
For simple games, Osborne [16] and Elkind et al. [7] gave the following result on the core and the nucleolus. CS-core. Taking coalition structure into consideration, we can arrive at another solution concept, CS-core. Given a cooperative game Γ = (N, γ), a coalition structure over N is a partition of N , i.e., a collection of subsets
, and x(C j ) = γ(C j ) for each j ∈ {1, · · · , k}. In general, an outcome of the game Γ is a pair (CS, x), where CS is a coalition structure and x is a corresponding payoff vector. The CS-core of the game Γ = (N, γ), denoted by C cs (Γ ), is the set of outcomes (CS, x) satisfying the constraints of "group rationality". That is,
A stronger property that is also enjoyed by many practically useful games is superadditivity. The game Γ = (N, γ) is superadditive if it satisfies γ(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) ≥ γ(S 1 ) + γ(S 2 ) for every pair of disjoint coalitions S 1 , S 2 ⊆ N . This implies that the agents can earn at least as much profit by working together within the grand coalition. Therefore, for superadditive games, it is always assumed that the agents form the grand coalition. For a (non-superadditive) game Γ = (N, γ), we can define a new game Γ * = (N, γ * ) by setting
where CS S denotes the space of all coalition structures over S and γ(CS ) = C∈CS γ(C). It is easy to verify that the game Γ * is superadditive, and it is called the superadditive cover of Γ . The relationship between the CS-core of Γ and the core of its superadditive cover Γ * is presented in the following lemma [4, 12] .
Lemma 2 A cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) has nonempty CS-core if and only if its superadditive cover
Γ * = (N, γ * ) has a non-empty core. Moreover, if C(Γ * ) = ∅, then C cs (Γ ) = C(Γ * ).
Path Cooperative Game and Its Core
Let D = (V, E; s, t) be a connected flow network with unit arc capacity (called unit flow network), where V is the vertex set, E is the arc set, s, t ∈ V are the source and the sink of the network respectively. In this paper, an (s, t)-path is referred to a directed path from s to t that visits each vertex in V at most once. Let U, W ⊆ V be a partition of the vertex set V such that s ∈ U and t ∈ W , then the set of arcs with heads in U and tails in W is called an (s, t)-edgecut, denoted byĒ ⊆ E. An (s, t)-vertex-cut is a vertex subsetV ⊆ V \ {s, t} such that D \V is disconnected. An (s, t)-edge(vertex)-cut is minimum if its cardinality is minimum. In the remainder of the paper, (s, t)-edge(vertex)-cuts will be abbreviated as edge(vertex)-cut S for short. Given an edge-cutĒ, we denote its indicator vector by HĒ ∈ {0, 1} |E| , where HĒ(e) = 1 if e ∈Ē, and 0 otherwise. The indicator vector of a vertex-cut is defined analogously. Now we introduce two kinds of path cooperative games (PC-games), edge path cooperative games and vertex path cooperative games.
Definition 1 (Path cooperative game, PC-game) Let D = (V, E; s, t) be a unit flow network.
The associated edge path cooperative game (EPC-game)
− The player set is E;
denotes the induced subgraph with vertex set V and edge set S.
The associated vertex path cooperative game(VPC-game)
− The player set is V \ {s, t};
Clearly, PC-games fall into the class of simple games. Therefore, we can get the necessary and sufficient condition of the non-emptiness of the core directly from Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 Given an EPC-game Γ E and a VPC-game Γ V associated with network D = (V, E; s, t), then Moreover, when the core of a PC-game is nonempty, the only edge (vertex) in the edge(vertex)-cut is a veto player, both the core and the nucleolus can be given directly. In the following two sections, we only consider PC-games with empty core.
We note that PC-games also have a natural correspondence with flow games and in what follows, we will reveal the close relationship between flow games and PC-games. Let D = (V, E; s, t) be a unit flow network. Given N ⊆ E, each edge e ∈ N is controlled by one player, i.e., we can identify the set of edges N with the set of players. Edges not under control of any players, in E \ N , are called public arcs; they can be used freely by any coalition. Thus, a unit flow network with player set N is denoted as D N = (V, E; s, t) Definition 2 (Simple flow game) The simple flow game Γ f N = (N, γ) associated with the unit network D N is defined as:
(using only the edges in S and public edges).
Flow game is a classical combinatorial optimization game, which has been extensively studied. The core of the flow game Γ f N is nonempty if and only if there is a minimum edge-cut without public edges [18] . In this case, the core is exactly the convex hull of the indicator vectors of minimum edge-cuts without public edges in D [13, 18] , and the nucleolus can also be computed in polynomial time [5, 17] . Now we turn to discuss the CS-core of PC-games. It is easy to see that for the network D without public edges, the associated flow game is the superadditive cover of the corresponding EPC-game. Thus, the nonemptiness of CS-core of EPC-game is followed directly from Lemma 2.
Proposition 2 Given an EPC-game Γ E associated with network D = (V, E; s, t), then the CS-core of Γ E is nonempty and it is exactly the convex hull of the indicator vectors of minimum edge-cuts of D.
For a VPC-game, we can also establish some relationship with a flow game. Given a network D = (V, E; s, t), we transform it into a new network D V in the following way.
(
In the new constructed network D V , the player set is just the set E V and all the other edges are viewed as public edges. It is easy to show that in the new network D V , there must be a minimum edge-cut containing only edges in E V . Hence, we can verify that the flow game associated with the network D V E V is the superadditive cover of the corresponding VPC-game defined on D. Similarly, the nonemptiness of CS-core of VPC-game is followed from Lemma 2 and the results of core nonemptiness of flow games.
Proposition 3
Given an VPC-game Γ V associated with network D = (V, E; s, t), then the CS-core of Γ V is nonempty and it is exactly the convex hull of the indicator vectors of minimum vertex-cuts of D.
Least-core of PC-Games
In this section, we first discuss the least-core of EPC-games. Throughout this section, Γ E is an EPC-game associated with the network D = (V, E; s, t) with |E| = n. Denote by P the set of all (s,t)-path in D, and |P| = m. According to the definitions of EPC-game and the least-core, it is shown that LC(Γ E ) can be formulated as the following linear program:
In spite that the number of the constrains in (1) may be exponential in |E|, the LC-value and a least-core imputation can be found efficiently by ellipsoid algorithm with a polynomial-time separation oracle: Let (x, ε) be a candidate solution for LP(LC E ). We first check whether constraints x(E) = 1 and x(e) ≥ 0 (∀e ∈ E) are satisfied. Then, checking whether x(P ) ≥ 1 + ε (∀P ∈ P) are satisfied is transformed to solving the shortest (s, t)-path in D with respect to the edge length x(e) (∀e ∈ E), and this can aslo be done in polynomial time.
In what follows, we aim at giving a succinct characterization of the least-core for EPC-games. 
DLP(flow) :
Due to max-flow and min-cut theorem, the optimum value of (2) and (3) are equal, and the set of optimal solutions of (3) is exactly the convex hull of the indicator vectors of the minimum edge-cut of D, which is denoted by C E . On the other hand, it is known that the core of the flow game Γ f defined on D E is also the convex hull of the indicator vectors of the minimum edge-cut of D. Hence, we have Theorem 1 Let Γ E and Γ f be an EPC-game and a flow game defined on D = (V, E; s, t), respectively, f * be the value of the max-flow of D. Then,
x ∈ LC(Γ E ) if and only if x = z/f * for some z ∈ C E .
Proof. Let x = (1 + ε)z be a transformation, then (1) can be rewritten as max ε
Combining the first constraint z(E) = 1/(1 + ε) and the objective function min{1 + ε}, it is easy to see that linear program (4) is the same as DLP(flow) (3). Since the optimal value of (3) is also f * , Theorem 1 thus follows.
Based on the relationship between a VPC-game and the corresponding flow game discussed in Section 3, we can obtain a similar result on the least-core for VPC-games (The proof is omitted).
Theorem 2 Let Γ V = (E, γ V ) be a VPC-game defined on D = (V, E; s, t), f * be the value of the max-flow of D, then x ∈ LC(Γ V ) if and only if x = z/f * for some z ∈ C V .
Here C V is the convex hull of the indicator vectors of minimum vertex-cuts in D.
Theorem 1 and 2 show that for the unit flow network, the least-core of the PC-game is equivalent to the core of the corresponding flow game in the sense of scaling down by 1/f * . Hence, all the following problems for PC-games can be solved efficiently:
-Computing the LC-value; -Finding an imputation in LC(Γ E ) and LC(Γ V ); -Checking whether a given imputation is in LC(Γ E ) or LC(Γ V ).
Remark. Path cooperative games have close relationship with a non-cooperative two-person zero-sum game, called path intercept game [21] . In this model, an "evader" attempts to select a path P from the source to the sink through a given network. At the same time, an "interdictor" attempts to select an edge e in this network to detect the evader. If the evader traverses through arc e, he is detected; otherwise, he goes undetected. The interdictor aims to find a probabilistic "edge-inspection" strategy to maximize the average probability of detecting the evader. While for the evader, he wants to find a "path-selection strategy" to minimize the interdiction probability. Aziz et al. [2] observed that the mixed Nash Equilibrium of path intercept games is the same as the least-core of EPC-games. With max-min theorem in matrix game theory, the same result can be obtained based on the similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Nucleolus of PC-games
In this section, we aim at showing that the nucleolus of PC-games can be computed in polynomial time. Given a game Γ = (N, γ), Kopelowitz [15] showed that the nucleolus η(Γ ) can be obtained by recursively solving the following standard sequence of linear programs SLP (η(Γ )):
Initially, set J 0 = {∅, N } and ε 0 = 0. The number ε r is the optimal value of the r-th program LP r , and J r = {S ⊆ N : x(S) = γ(S) + ε r , ∀x ∈ X r }, where X r = {x ∈ R n : (x, ε r ) is an optimal solution of LP r }.
As in the last section, we first discuss the nucleolus of EPC-games. Let Γ E be the EPC-game associated with network D = (V, E; s, t) with |E| = n, P be the set of all (s, t)-paths and f * be the value of the max-flow of D. Denote E Γ be the set of coalitions consisting of one-edge coalitions and path coalitions, i.e., E Γ = {{e} : e ∈ E} ∪ {P ⊆ E : P ∈ P is an (s, t)-path}.
We show that the sequential linear programs SLP (η(Γ E )) of EPC-game Γ E can be simplified as follows.
∀e ∈ E r , r = 0, 1, ..., k − 1 x(e) ≥ ε, ∀e ∈ E\ k−1 r=0 E r x(P ) = 1/f * + ε r , ∀P ∈ P r , r = 0, 1, ..., k − 1
∀e ∈ E x(E) = 1. (5) where ε r is the optimum value of LP r , X r = {x ∈ R n : (x, ε r ) is an optimal solution of LP r }, P r = {P ∈ P : x(P ) = 1 + ε r , ∀x ∈ X r } and E r = {e ∈ E : x(e) = ε r , ∀x ∈ X r }. Initially, ε 0 = 0, P 0 = ∅ and E 0 = ∅.
Proposition 4
The nucleolus η(Γ E ) of EPC-game Γ E defined on the network D = (V, E; s, t) can be obtained by computing the linear programs LP k in (5).
Proof. Firstly, we show that in sequential linear programs SLP (η(Γ )), only the constrains corresponding to the the coalitions in E Γ (i.e., the one-edge coalitions and path coalitions) are necessary in determining the nucleolus η(Γ E ).
In fact, for any winning coalition S ⊆ N (not a path), S can be decomposed into a path P and some edges E = S\E(P ). Then,
Since x(e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E , S cannot be fixed before P or any e ∈ E . After P and all e ∈ E are fixed, S is also fixed, i.e., S is redundant. If S is a losing coalition, then S is a set of edges with γ(S) = 0 and x(S) − γ(S) = e∈S x(e) ≥ x(e), ∀e ∈ S. That is to say, S cannot be fixed before any e ∈ S. When all edges in S are fixed, S is fixed accordingly, i.e. S is also redundant in this case. Therefore, deleting all the constrains corresponding to the coalitions not in E Γ will not change the result of SLP (η(Γ )).
The key point in remainder of the proof is the correctness of the third and the forth constrains in (5), where we replace the original constrains x(P ) = 1 + ε r and x(P ) ≥ 1 + ε in SLP (η(Γ )) with new constrains x(P ) = 1/f * + ε r and x(P ) ≥ 1/f * + ε, respectively. In the process of solving the sequential linear programs, the optimal values increase with k. Since C(Γ E ) = ∅, we know ε 1 < 0. Note that we can always find an optimal solution such that ε 1 > −1 (for example x(e) = 1 n , ∀e ∈ E is a feasible solution of the linear programming of LC(Γ E )).
We can divide the process into two stages. The first stage is the programs with −1 < ε r < 0. In this case, the constraints x(e) ≥ ε, ∀e ∈ E cannot effect the optimal solutions of the current programs, because x(e) ≥ 0. Ignoring the invalid constraints we can get (5) directly.
The second stage is the programs with ε r ≥ 0. When the programs arrive at this stage, we can claim that all paths have been fixed. Otherwise, if there is a path satisfying x(p) = 1 + ε r ≥ 1, then we have x(p) = 1 (note x(E) = 1), contradicting with the precondition the value of maximum flow f * ≥ 2. Then we can omit the path constraints in this stage and then this implies (5) .
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
In the following, by making us the known results on the nucleolus of flow games, we shall show that the nucleolus of PC-games can be solved in polynomial time. Let Γ f = (E, γ) be the flow game defined on the unit flow network D = (V, E; s, t). It is easy to show that the sequential linear programs LP (η(Γ f )) can be simplified as LP k , (k = 1, 2, ...) :
where ε r is the optimum value of LP r , X r = {x ∈ R n : (x, ε r ) is an optimal solution of LP r }, P r = {P ∈ P : x(P ) = 1 + ε r , ∀x ∈ X r } and E r = {e ∈ E :
x(e) = ε r , ∀x ∈ X r }. Initially, ε 0 = 0, P 0 = ∅ and E 0 = ∅. Deng et al. [5] proved that the sequential linear programs LP k , (k = 1, 2...) can be transformed to another sequential linear programs with only polynomial number of constrains, and it follows that the nucleolus of flow game η(Γ f ) can be found efficiently. Futhermore, Potters et al. [17] , show that the nucleolus of flow games with public edge can also be found in polynomial time when the core is nonempty. Based on these known results, we discuss the algorithmic problem on the nucleolus of PC-games in the following theorems.
Theorem 3
Let Γ E and Γ f be the EPC-game and flow game defined on a unit flow network D = (V, E; s, t), respectively. The nucleolus of Γ E can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore,
where f * is the value of the max-flow of D.
Proof. Notice that the dimension of the feasible regions of LP k (k = 1, 2...) decreases in each step, so we can end up the process within at most |N | steps. The key point here is to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the optimal solutions of LP k (6) and that of LP k (5) (∀k = 1, 2, · · · ).
We first prove that if (z * ,ε * ) is an optimal solution of LP k (6), the (x * , ε * ) = (z * /f * ,ε * /f * ) is an optimal solution of LP k (5). When k = 1, we have E 0 = ∅, P 0 = ∅ in LP 1 . And it is easy to check the feasibility and the optimality of (z * , ε * ) in LP 1 . To continue the proof recursively, we need to explain E 1 =Ẽ 1 and P 1 =P 1 , i.e., the constrains which become tight in every iteration are exactly the same in the two linear programs. For each e ∈ E, if z * (e) =ε * , then x * (e) = z * (e)/f * =ε * /f * = ε * . And if z * (e) >ε * , then we have x * (e) > ε * . Thus, E 1 =Ẽ 1 . P 1 =P 1 can be shown analogously. The other direction of the result can be shown similarly. That is, the conclusion holds for k = 1.
For the rest iteration k = 2, 3, · · · , the proof can be carried out in a same way. Here we omit the detail of the proof. Since the nucleolus of flow game can be found in polynomial time, it follows that the nucleolus of EPC-game is also efficiently solvable.
As for the nucleolus of VPC-games, we also show that it is polynomially solvable based on the relationship between a VPC-game and the corresponding flow game demonstrated in Section 3. Due to the space limitation, the proof of the following theroem is omitted. Thus, the EPC-game defined on undirected network D = (V, E; s, t) is transformed to an EPC-game defined on the constructed directed network − → D = (V, − → E ; s, t). Furthermore, it is easy to check that there exists one-to-one correspondence for the game solution (such as, the core, the least-core and the nucleolus) between the two games. As for a VPC-game defined on an undirected network, we first transform it into EPC-game on an undirected network as demonstrated in Section 3, and then transform it to EPC-game on a directed network in the same way as above. Henceforth, the algorithmic results for PCgames can be generalized from directed networks to undirected networks.
Theorem 5
Computing the least-core and the nucleolus can be done in polynomial time for both EPC-games and VPC-games defined on undirected networks.
